This paper explores the robustness of the positive association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns (using the Fama-French-Cahart four factor model) documented in the literature and potential explanations thereof. Utilizing hand-collected shareholder rights data for the [1978][1979][1980][1981][1982][1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989] period in conjunction with the existing post-1990 RiskMetrics data, we document that: (1) over the 1978-2007, the association is indeed robust to a variety of controls, fixed effects and different methodologies (such as estimating firm-level abnormal returns); (2) the existence and strength of this association co-varies with M&A waves; (3) while being acquired and making acquisitions are strongly associated with abnormal stock returns, these effects do not explain the association; and (4) once the four factor model is supplemented with the Cremers, Nair & John (2009) takeover factor -which captures risk associated with time-varying investment opportunities and thus relates to the state of the M&A market -the association disappears.
Introduction
The association between shareholder rights and stock returns has been a subject of academic inquiry since Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, henceforth GIM) . They document that over the 1990-1999 period stocks with "weak" shareholder rights had negative abnormal stock returns and stock with "strong" shareholder rights had positive abnormal stock returns. Weak (strong) shareholder rights means having high (low) GIndex scores. The G-Index counts the number of 24 anti-shareholder rights provisions, many of which are anti-takeover provisions (such as poison pills and classified boards), a firm has in a given year.
1 Economically, the results reported in GIM (2003) are quite strong, with a value-weighted portfolio that buys (sells) firms with strong (weak)
shareholder rights having an annualized abnormal return of 8. 7% over 1990-1999. Any association between stock returns and the strength of a firm's shareholder rights, as captured by the G-Index (or the E-Index, which focuses on six of the 24 GIndex provisions), may be puzzling ex ante. After all, any effect of shareholder rights (at some point after those are made public information) on firm performance would presumably be already capitalized into the firm's current stock price if markets are reasonably efficient. It is therefore not surprising that the reported association has generated an extensive debate in the literature over whether this association is in fact robust and, if so, what explains such an association. This literature on the relationship between stock returns and shareholder rights, whether addressing robustness or potential explanations, has focused almost exclusively on the 1990s and 2000s, given the general unavailability of pre-1990 shareholder rights data.
In this paper, we address the twin questions of robustness and potential explanations using new hand-collected annual shareholder rights data over the [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] (inclusive) period that was first introduced in Cremers and Ferrell (2011) . In conjunction with the shareholder rights data for 1990-2007 from RiskMetrics (previously Investor
Responsibility Research Center or IRRC), this provides us with thirty years of shareholder rights data for some 2,200 unique firms. Adding pre-1990 data has the significant benefit not only of utilizing extensive "out of sample" data, but also data that is from a time period (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) ) that experienced substantial changes in the domain of shareholder rights along three important dimensions: (i) the legal rules governing the effectiveness of shareholder rights; (ii) the incidence of these provisions at the firm level; and (3) the incidence and composition of merger and acquisition activity, including the rise and fall in the 1980s of a substantial hostile takeover market. 2 These three changes collectively represent significant cross-sectional and time series variation in terms of the incidence and impact of anti-shareholder rights provisions. As a result, the 1980s are an interesting period to study the relationship between shareholder rights and stock returns.
As documented in Cremers and Ferrell (2011) , the post-1990 period has little time variation in the G-Index and little hostile takeover activity, though a substantial M&A wave around the year 2000.
We first consider whether the association between abnormal returns and shareholder rights is robust. Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2011) document that the association between stock returns and shareholder rights no longer exists post-2000, while Johnson, Moorman, Sorescu (2009) raises concerns over whether industry effects have been properly controlled for (see also Lewellen & Metrick (2010) ).
We document that the association between stock returns and shareholder rights is generally robust over the 1978-2007 (inclusive) time period. For example, a valueweighted portfolio that buys stocks in the decile with strongest shareholder rights while simultaneously selling stocks in the decile with the weakest shareholder rights has a fourfactor (Fama-French-Cahart) alpha of 3.93% per year (t-statistic of 2.43) over 1978-2007. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio has an annualized alpha of 4.58% per year (t-statistic of 3.88). Importantly, this association is robust to employing pooled panels of firm-level alphas (based on individual, (bi)annual firm betas estimated using daily returns). Utilizing firm-level firm alphas with betas that vary across stocks and time is a useful robustness check given the restrictions inherent in estimating abnormal returns solely using stock portfolios (see Ang, Liu and Schwarz, 2010) . Controlling for industry effects (using either 48 Fama-French or 3-digit SIC industry groups) eliminates any alpha in value-weighted portfolios, though equally-weighted portfolios and results from the pooled panel approach using firm-level alphas are largely unaffected.
The strength of the association between shareholder rights and stock returns exhibits strong time variation over our 30-year period. We strength of the association seems particularly strong during times of the most active M&A markets. This novel covariation result suggests that the decline of the association in recent years may be related to the corresponding decline of the M&A market, and further suggests that it could return in the next M&A wave.
Next, we consider three potential explanations of the apparently robust association between stock returns and shareholder rights, i.e. firms with stronger shareholder rights outperforming firms with weaker shareholder rights. We consider these three hypotheses particularly in light of the strong time co-variation of the strength of the association with M&A activity that we newly document.
First, it could be that the market has slowly learned about the importance of shareholder rights. This possibility was raised in the GIM (2003) paper and further explored in Bebchuk Cohen & Wang (2011) . Under this "learning" hypothesis, the association between the G-Index and abnormal stock returns would continue until the importance of good corporate governance was fully appreciated by market participants.
This implies that there should be an initially positive (negative) abnormal return associated with strong (weak) shareholder rights when investors first learn about their importance, while the abnormal return then disappears at some point after it has been fully incorporated in firm stock prices.
We argue that our 30-year evidence, and specifically the time variation in the association between shareholder rights and stock returns, provides significant counterevidence to this "learning" hypothesis. The outperformance of firms with strong shareholder rights and underperformance of firms with weak shareholder rights is quite pronounced in the mid-1980s, such that the learning hypothesis would imply that market participants would need seemingly short memories for the effect to return in the second half of the 1990s. The co-variation between the strength of the association and M&A activity could indicate that learning is particularly important during M&A waves, but it is unclear why investors in the 1990s would not have understood the importance of shareholder rights during M&A waves from their experience in the 1980s.
The second explanation for the association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns is that firms with strong shareholders rights may have performed persistently and unexpectedly well during over our time period. However, Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006) find no evidence that firms with strong (weak) shareholder rights had consistently positive earnings surprises during 1990-1999. The time variation in the association between shareholder rights and stock returns suggests another possibility, namely that there were unexpected levels of M&A activity over this period, while firms with stronger shareholder rights generally outperforming during such times.
We consider two ways in which M&A activity could produce an ex post association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns, both of which are related to the takeover premium accruing to target shareholders and (largely) coming from acquirer shareholders: (a) firms with strong shareholder rights, e.g. with few antitakeover provisions, may be more likely to be taken over or on average receive larger takeover premia (see Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2011) and John and Kadyrzhanova (2011) ), or (b) firms with weak shareholder rights may be more likely to overpay when acquiring firms, i.e. to engage in value-destroying empire building (see Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) ). We find evidence consistent with both effects, but also document that neither effect can explain (or even affect) the overall association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns.
The third explanation is that the model used to document abnormal returns may be mis-specified, e.g. the abnormal positive and negative returns accruing to firms with strong and weak shareholder rights, respectively, may be due to a missing risk factor. The relevance of this missing factor would then have to be affected by the presence of antishareholder provisions -i.e., the omitted source of systemic risk would have to be correlated with a firm's G-Index score. That would imply that the association between shareholder rights and stock returns is driven by beta (i.e., systematic risk), and is not alpha (i.e., abnormal performance) at all.
In particular, Cremers, Nair, & John (2009) introduce a model with time-varying investment opportunities and discount rates. Empirically, they propose a 'takeover factor' to capture a firm's sensitivity to changing systematic investment opportunities. They use firms with high (low) ex ante likelihood of being taken over to identify firms with greater (lower) sensitivity to changes in economy-wide investment opportunities, given the strongly pro-cyclical behavior of M&A activity (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) ).
Their takeover factor, constructed as a long-short portfolio that buys (sells) stocks of with high (low) ex ante takeover likelihood, is shown to matter for cross-sectional pricing.
Adding the takeover factor from Cremers, Nair, & John (2009) completely eliminates any association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns, but only if we allow the takeover beta to vary across time and to be firm-specific. 3 This is not only consistent with strong time variation in the importance of shareholder rights, but also with other firm characteristics (other than shareholder rights) being related to a firm's loading on the takeover factor or a firm's exposure to changes in systematic investment opportunities. We thus conclude that the finding that stocks with strong shareholder rights outperform stocks with weak shareholder rights seems to be driven by differences in beta, and are thus predicted to return during the next significant M&A wave.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data, particularly the evolution of the G-Index distribution over 1978-2007. In section 3, we explore the robustness of the association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns.
Section 4 considers the three explanations of the apparently robust association, and section 5 concludes.
Data
The existing literature is mostly based on the RiskMetrics (previously IRRC) database for firms' G-Index scores. This database starts, however, only in 1990. We hand-collected data from SEC filings (10-K, 10-Q, 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Accordingly, we will analyze the association between shareholder rights and stock returns based on employing firm-specific, time-varying betas in Section 3.3, after presenting the standard portfolio-based results first in Section 3.2. Section 3.4 will focus on the time variation in the association.
Portfolio-Based Results
We begin our investigation into whether there is in fact a robust association between the strength of shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns by first presenting results based on the portfolio-based approach. The portfolio-based results are also analyzed adjusting for industry effects, using both the Fama-French 48 industry groups as well as employing 3-digit SIC code industry groups as in Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu
We weigh our portfolios of "weak" and "strong" shareholder rights by firm market capitalization as well as constructing portfolios by equally weighting firms. Next, we form long-short portfolios by going long the portfolio with strong shareholder rights (i.e., low G-Index stocks) and shorting the portfolio with weak shareholder rights (i.e., high G-Index stocks), where strong (weak) are defined as being in the bottom (top) quintile or bottom (top) decile in the G-Index distribution for that year. Being in the bottom (top) of the distribution represents means strong (weak) shareholder rights given that the G-Index counts the number of anti-shareholder provisions a firm has at a given point in time, with a higher G-Index score therefore indicating more anti-shareholder provisions. We report both annualized "excess returns," defined as returns in excess of the risk-free rate, and annualized abnormal returns, i.e. alphas generated by regressing monthly returns of the long-short portfolio on the returns of the four Fama-FrenchCarhart factors (Fama & French (1993); Carhart (1997) ).
In all cases, we use only information that would have been publicly available at the time of the portfolio construction. We update our portfolios sometime after the new G-Index data would be available. For 1978-1989, we update portfolios at the end of June each year, using only information that was contained in the corporate documents pertaining to the prior fiscal year. For data after 1990, we follow the convention in the literature of updating portfolios in the month after IRRC made the data available (generally every two years). Table II reports the abnormal return results for long-short portfolios that were formed based on either firms' G-Index decile or quintile rankings (using value weighted portfolios in Panel A and equally-weighted portfolios in Panel B). 5 As can be seen in Table II, shareholder rights and abnormal returns disappears or is significantly diminished. We will return to the changing relationship between shareholder rights and stock returns in Section 3.4's discussion of time variation. Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009)'s main methodology involves forming matching portfolios based upon firms' three-digit SIC-codes. Every month and for each stock in, say, the lowest G-Index decile portfolio, we create a value-weighted industry-matched portfolio containing only stocks for which we know the G-Index score but that are not included in the lowest G-Index decile portfolio, and have the same three-digit SIC code as that particular stock. In addition, we also form matching portfolios based upon firms' 48 Fama-French industry group analogously. We subtract the return of the valueweighted industry-matched portfolio from the firm's monthly stock return to create that month's industry-adjusted return for that stock.
Table III documents the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart abnormal returns using industry-adjusted stock returns. For equally-weighted portfolios using decile portfolios, the abnormal return using 3-digit SIC-matched portfolios is 3.32% per year, statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistics of 2.57), and is 2.92% per year using 48 FamaFrench industry group-matched portfolios, also statistically significant at the 1% level.
Industry-adjusting makes a significant difference for the 1990-1999 and 1990-2007 periods (replicating Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009)) for value-weighted portfolios. For 1978 For -1990 and for the entire 1978-2007 period, equally-weighted portfolios are largely unaffected, though the value-weighted portfolios no longer produce abnormal returns after industry-adjusting. We thus conclude that the industry effects are primarily important for the largest stocks, while they do not seem to drive the association between shareholder rights and stock returns for the majority of stocks. In subsequent sections, we will do additional robustness checks to investigate this further.
Results using Firm-Specific Time-Varying Betas
In contrast to the existing portfolio-based approach, this section will estimate abnormal returns and their association with the strength of firms' shareholder rights based on estimating individual firm betas, individual firm betas which we allow to vary annually or biannually (based on when the G-Index is updated). Our analysis, as before, will utilize data over the entire 1978-2007 period.
We proceed in two steps. The first step consists of estimating abnormal returns for each stock over annual or two-year periods. Specifically, we regress each individual firm's daily stock return on the standard four factor model, i.e. the three Fama-French (1993) factor model plus the Carhart momentum factor (1997). We incorporate nonsynchronous trading and other microstructure issues by also adding a one-day lag of each factor (Dimson (1979) ). We run these regressions separately by stock and separately for each period over which the stock's G-Index is updated (i.e., annually using July-June data for 1978-1989 and generally using two years of data thereafter, i.e. using periods between IRRC updates), requiring at least 100 daily returns. As a result, the factor loadings vary both across firms and across time. The alpha is the coefficient on the constant multiplied by 250 to arrive at an annualized estimate of the abnormal return.
Panel A of Table IV shows the distribution of the firm-level market betas by GIndex quintile (i.e., the sum of the coefficient on the contemporaneous market return plus the one-day lagged market return) using the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart model.
This indicates very significant dispersion of market betas within each G-Index quintile, whereas there is almost no variation in the median market betas across G-Index quintiles.
Panel B reports analogous results for takeover factor loadings (a fifth factor in addition to the Fama-French-Carhart four factors from Cremers, Nair & John (2009)). Again, there is significant dispersion of takeover betas within each G-Index quintile, but very little dispersion in the median takeover betas across G-Index quintiles. Results are similar for the other factor loadings (not reported). As a result, using portfolios, and thus a portfoliobased approach, would in fact ignore considerable variation in firm level betas (see further Ang, Liu, and Schwartz (2010) ).
In our second step, we regress our annualized abnormal stock return estimates on dummy variables representing the bottom and top quintile ranking in the G-Index distribution (Table V) or just the G-Index itself (Table VI) . For instance, a firm in the bottom G-Index quintile (20% of firms with the strongest shareholders rights as measured by their G-Index scores), the dummy variable representing the bottom quintile would assume a value of one. In some specifications, certain fixed effects plus additional controls for other variables that may potentially impact our daily abnormal stock returns are also included. These additional controls consist of the lagged values for the following variables: inclusion in the S&P 500 index; log of market capitalization; institutional ownership; return on equity, sales growth; Herfindahl score of the firm's industry based on sales of all firms in Compustat; dividend yield; and the log of the firm's book-tomarket ratio. The resulting coefficient values are multiplied by 100, such that these are expressed in percentage terms.
All second-step specifications use year fixed effects with some specifications using other fixed effects as well. We control for industry using fixed effects based either on the Fama-French (FF) 48 industry classification or the firm's 3-digit SIC code or 48FF
x. year fixed effects. Finally, the robust standard errors are always clustered at the firm level (except when explicitly stated otherwise, e.g. for variables that only vary across time, for which we report the standard errors clustered by time). In the second step, we also (in unreported regressions) check to ensure that our results our robust to incorporating the estimation risk of the first step by weighting the observations by the volatility of the standard errors in the first step.
The results of the second step using the four-factor Fama-French Carhart abnormal returns and G-Index quintiles are presented in Table V . Panel A presents the shows the results using G-Index quintile dummies without using any additional controls while Panel B are the results using additional controls. In column 1 of Panel A, without controls and only using year fixed effects, there is a strongly statistically significant association between having "weak" shareholder rights (i.e., top quintile in the G-Index distribution) and negative abnormal returns, and between having "strong" shareholder rights and positive abnormal returns. Economically, firms in the top (bottom) quintile have annualized abnormal returns of -1.78% (1.5%), which estimates are consistent with the results for equally-weighted portfolios in Panel B of Table II . The negative association between weak shareholder rights and abnormal returns remains whether one uses 48 FF fixed effects or 3-digit SIC or 48FF x. year fixed effects, both with and without additional controls. This shows that the association between shareholder rights and alpha is robust to estimating firm level alphas and betas that vary across time.
However, when adding firm fixed effects (column 5 of Panel A and Panel B) the association becomes insignificant. This suggests that the association may be primarily cross-sectional, and that abnormal returns do not change significantly after a firm makes large changes in its G-Index. As we seem to have considerable time variation in the GIndex, this may indicate a lack of robustness that we will revisit shortly. However, an alternative interpretation for the firm fixed effects results, which we will advance below in Section 3.4, is that the strength of the association is time varying. Another alternative interpretation, for which we also provide some evidence below in Section 3.4, is that the importance of firm fixed effects may indicate misspecification in the asset pricing model used, where such misspecification is correlated with the firm's average G-Index.
Econometrically, firm fixed effects remove the time-invariant portion of the estimated firm-specific abnormal return. One possibility for the source of such a time-invariant abnormal return is mis-measurement in the underlying asset pricing model used to generate the abnormal returns in the first place. This is an issue which we will also return to when we consider the impact of adding a takeover risk factor in Section 4 where we explore potential explanations for the association.
The same basic pattern emerges when one uses as an explanatory variable the (continuous) G-Index, rather than G-Index quintiles. These results are presented in Table   VI When one uses the additional controls (Panel B)the economically meaningful, statistically significant negative association still remains except for when the 3-digit SIC classification is used. One issue to bear in mind in considering this last result is that once the time-varying nature of the association between shareholder rights and stock returns is taken into account, as we will do below in Section 3.4, the negative association between the (continuous) G-Index and stock returns remains, including when one uses the 3-digit SIC classification. As in Table V , the negative association disappears when firm fixed effects is used (column 5 of Panel A and B).
Time Variation
There are in fact strong reasons to hypothesize that unconditional effects, such as those presented in Table VI , are missing an important aspect of the relationship between shareholder rights and stock returns over time. As discussed in Cremers & Ferrell (2011) and Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) , the G-Index to a significant extent tracks firms'
anti-takeover provisions, such as classified boards and poison pills, and hence might potentially affect the probability of shareholders receiving an attractive takeover bid.
Consistent with this, Cremers & Ferrell (2011) Table III) . Also presented in Figure 3 are the results of a regression of the 24-month moving average on a constant term and a trend. Results are presented in Table VII .
Whether one uses the 48 Fama-French industries, 3-digit SIC, 48 FF industry x.
year fixed effects or even firm fixed effects, the interaction is negative, statistically significant and economically meaningful. Indeed, the G-Index by itself is either no longer statistically significant or positive albeit small in magnitude. The negative effect of the GIndex on stock returns appears to be entirely a function of its interaction with the level of M&A activity.
The importance of M&A activity on the strength of the association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns will serve as a critical consideration in our exploration of alternative explanations of this association.
Explanations of the Association
We now turn to the potential explanations for the generally robust association between abnormal returns (as measured by the Fama-French-Cahart four factor model) and weak shareholder rights (as measured by the G-Index): the learning hypothesis; the M&A activity explanation (takeover premium and value-destroying acquisitions effects); and the omitted risk factor hypothesis. These different explanations are not mutually exclusive.
The Learning Hypothesis
This first hypothesis posits that the market only fully appreciated over the course of the 1990s the importance of shareholder rights to firm performance. The hypothesis is considered in both Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2011) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) , and both papers find supporting evidence. This hypothesis predicts that the positive alpha associated with long-short portfolios based on firms' low-high G-Index scores should be consistently positive over the 1990s, as the market impounds into the stock price its learning about the importance of shareholder rights, and then dissipates at the end of the learning period when there is no further information to be acquired at this point.
It is apparent from Figure 3 that the relationship between shareholder rights and abnormal returns is far from stable over time. There is a spike in the positive abnormal returns associated with the long-short portfolio positions roughly around 1986 and 1999, both years in which M&A activity was at historically high levels. The relationship is largely absent or even reverses, in the early 1980s, late 1980s/early 1990s and after the internet bubble bursting in 2001. These are periods when M&A markets were generally quite subdued. On the whole, we conclude that abnormal returns are not consistently positive and then dissipating at some point, but rather move in cycles broadly consistent with the intensity of M&A activity.
One interpretation of this evidence is that learning about the importance of shareholder rights happens primarily during M&A waves. Still, that begs the question of why investors didn't fully understand their importance after their experience in the 1980s.
On the other hand, as can also be seen in the two trend lines plotted in Figure 3 (one for equally-weighted and one for value-weighted), the long-short portfolio positions generally result in less alpha as time progresses. Abnormal returns associated with longshort portfolios with shareholder rights are generally becoming weaker over time, with the largest abnormal returns for the broader-based equally-weighted portfolios generally occurring in the 1980s. This general pattern could arguably be consistent with very slow learning over time, with learning accelerating during M&A waves.
In work that remains to be done, we plan to conduct more formal tests of the learning hypothesis following Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2011), particularly investigating whether investor earnings surprises are consistent with learning over our 30 year period and are related to M&A activity as well.
M&A Activity
Following up on the evidence of the importance of M&A activity on the impact of the G-Index presenting in Table VII , we will now consider two ways in which M&A activity could produce an ex post association between shareholder rights and stock returns. The first is the 'takeover premium explanation,' namely that firms with weak shareholder rights experience lower returns during M&A waves as a result of the firm having a reduced probability of receiving and/or accepting an attractive takeover offer.
This possibility is consistent with the work of Kadyrzhanova & Rhodes-Kropf (2011) and John & Kadyrzhanova (2011) . This explanation would therefore suggest that weak shareholder rights (i.e., high G-Index scores) will have a particularly pronounced negative effect on returns when the firm in question happens to be in an industry that is the subject of a takeover wave. Anti-takeover provisions have increased salience when there is a heightened chance of an attractive takeover bid being proffered.
The second explanation is that firms with weak shareholder rights may be more likely to overpay for firms when acquiring and hence reduce their shareholder returns in this way. This hypothesis is related to the work of Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) who document negative abnormal returns associated with acquisition announcements by firms with weak shareholder rights.
Both of these explanations likewise require that the market did not fully anticipate either the merger wave or the importance of shareholder rights in acquisition activity, and is thus broadly consistent in this way with the learning hypothesis. For example, if the market would fully anticipate the merger wave, any reduced probability of receiving an attractive takeover bid due to having more takeover defenses would already be capitalized into the stock price. However, the difficulty of investors predicting M&A waves is broadly consistent with the evidence in e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) that M&A waves are largely pro-cyclical (and timing the overall market is presumably very difficult) and a function of technological and regulatory shocks (which may also be hard to predict).
We explore the conditional effect of weak shareholder rights suggested by the takeover premium explanation using firm-level abnormal return regressions as in Tables   V and VI . To test the ex post explanation that the abnormal stock return effects result from firms in our sample that are being acquired, we include a target dummy for whether the firm was acquired in a particular year. This dummy should be positive, as being acquired is associated with higher stock returns due to the generally large takeover premium paid to target shareholders. If the likelihood of being a target or the size of the takeover premium are positively related to having more shareholder rights, this could potentially explain the association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns. If so, then the coefficient for the G-Index and its interaction with M&A activity should become statistically insignificant once this target dummy variable is included in the regression.
We test the second explanation concerning value-destroying acquisitions by including the acquisition announcement returns of the acquiring firms. Specifically, Acq_Return is the three-day window abnormal return around the day of the acquisition announcement, estimated using a market model. We would generally expect the acquisition announcement return to have a positive coefficient. If its relation to the level of shareholder rights (as established in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007)) is sufficiently large, it could potentially explain the negative association of the G-Index or the negative coefficient of the G-Index interaction with M&A activity.
The results of these regressions are presented in Table VIII . Both the takeover premium and the value-destroying acquisition explanation are supported by the data. The dummy on the target dummy is consistently positive, economically meaningful and statistically significant at the 1% level. This remains true whether fixed effects include the 48 Fama-French (columns 3 and 4) or 3-digit SIC industry (columns 5 and 6) or firm fixed effects (columns 7 and 8) or no fixed effects other than year fixed effects are used (columns 1 and 2). Likewise the coefficient value on acquisition returns is also consistently positive, economically meaningful and statistically significant regardless of the fixed effects used (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). However, neither acquisition status nor acquisition returns effect diminishes the coefficient on the interaction of the G-Index with M&A activity, which remains consistently negative, economically meaningful and statistical significant (columns 1-8).
Omitted Risk Factor: The Takeover Factor
The mispricing hypothesis posits that the estimated abnormal returns are driven by an omitted risk factor that is not included in the asset pricing model used. As a result, because of model misspecification, what appears to be alpha is in reality captured by the beta from the omitted risk factor. In other words, the results are driven by asset pricing model misspecification rather than genuinely representing abnormal returns, whereas this misspecification is correlated with the G-Index.
One candidate for the omitted risk factor is the "takeover factor" proposed by Cremers, Nair & John (2009) . This factor is intended to capture a firm stock return's sensitivity to changes in the investment opportunity set, which is proxied by a firm's exposure to the M&A environment. Specifically, the takeover factor is a long-short portfolio that buys firms with a high ex ante probability of being taken over, and sells firms where such probability is estimated to be low. The economic intuition is that takeover waves are strongly pro-cyclical and thus related to systematic investment opportunities. As a result, firms that are more likely takeover candidates are expected to be more sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. This could be a priced risk if investors care about the timing of their income. For example, firms that are likely targets may be considered more risky, as they will generally perform best during M&A waves, which generally happen during bull markets when the investors put less value on such outperformance.
We test this hypothesis by appending the takeover factor to the Fama-FrenchCarhart four-factor model, and then estimate firms' daily abnormal returns based on the resulting five factor model. The resulting estimated annual abnormal returns, based on the five factor model, are then regressed on the firms' G-Index (or using quintile dummies).
We also regress these returns on the (continuous) G-Index and its interaction with M&A activity. In other words, we undertake the same analysis as was done in Tables V and VI but now utilizing a five-factor model. Year fixed effects are used throughout, plus various fixed effects and using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The results are presented in Table IX .
As documented in Table IX , the G-Index and the interaction with M&A activity are all statistically insignificant in all the specifications (columns 5-8). This stands in contrast to Tables VII and VIII where, using the four-factor model, this interaction effect is consistently economically meaningful and statistically strongly significant. For the top quintile dummy variable, i.e. the firms with weakest 20% of shareholder rights, the evidence is more mixed. Using only year fixed effects in column 1, the negative association is still statistically significant. If 48 industry group fixed effects are added in column 2, this negative association becomes only marginally statistically significant in column 2 with a t-statistic of 1.67. Finally, using 3-digit SIC industry fixed effects in column 3 renders the association insignificant, and likewise with firm fixed effects.
To verify that the weakening of the G-Index is indeed driven by exposure to the takeover factor, we regress the estimated takeover beta (the beta on the takeover factor estimated when estimating the five-factor model) on the G-Index and the interaction of the G-Index with M&A activity. In general, firms that increase their G-Index add additional takeover defenses, which may lower their exposure to the market for corporate control, and thus to the takeover factor. This would suggest a negative association between their takeover beta and changes in the G-Index. The evidence documented in Table X is consistent with this, as the coefficient on the G-Index is negative and statistically significant (columns 1 and 4), as is the interaction with M&A activity (columns 2 and 5).
Conclusion
In this paper, we address both the robustness of and the potential explanations for the association between shareholder rights, as proxied by the G-Index, and abnormal We find that equally-weighted long-short portfolios that buy (sell) firms with strong (weak) shareholder rights have economically meaningful and statistically significant positive abnormal returns using the four-factor model over this time period.
This result is robust to controlling for industry using 48 Fama-French industries or 3-digit SIC industries (as well as using 48 Fama-French x year fixed effects). The strength of the association appears to be cyclical over time, co-varying with the level M&A market. As a result, the abnormal returns accruing to portfolios based on shareholder rights are particularly large during the mid-1980s and the late 1990s.
Moving beyond the standard portfolio-based approach to estimating abnormal returns, we also estimate firm-level abnormal returns by allowing betas to vary across firms and time. This is methodologically important given the wide dispersion of betas on all four Fama-French-Cahart factors within groupings of firms with similar shareholder rights. The use of firm-level time-varying betas ensures that this information is not lost, and using pooled panel regressions of firm-level alphas allows for the use of additional firm-level controls. Again, we find that the association, whether we categorize firms by their G-Index quintile ranking or by their G-Index score, is robust to this approach.
Interestingly, we find that the association is entirely accounted for by the interaction of shareholder rights with the level of M&A activity.
We then turn to potential explanations for this apparently robust association between shareholder rights and abnormal stock returns. One possibility is that the abnormal returns are a function of market learning. The presence of the association during the 1980s implies that any learning could not have been solely a function of the 1990s. Moreover, the cyclical nature of the association over such a long period of time raises the issue as to how long learning could have plausibly taken.
Next, we consider the possibility that M&A waves, if partially unanticipated, could generate the association ex post. One possible mechanism is the positive abnormal returns associated with being an acquired firm, an event that might be a partial function of having strong shareholder rights. A second mechanism is negative abnormal returns associated with being a firm making a poor acquisition, an event that might be a partial function of having weak shareholder rights. We find that both being acquired and making an acquisition have significant abnormal stock return effects, but neither effect accounts for the association between shareholder rights and alpha.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the association is the result of an omitted risk factor, and specifically a risk factor that covaries with the state of the M&A market.
To this end, we supplement the Fama-French Cahart four factors with the takeover factor proposed in Cremers, Nair & John (2009) . With the introduction of this fifth factor, the association disappears. Consistent with model misspecification, if shareholder rights become weaker, a firm's exposure to this risk factor falls (i.e. the loading on the takeover factor declines after the G-Index increases).
TABLE I DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This table presents the number of observations, the means and standard deviations of our main variables of interest. The number of observations is counted as the number of times the G-Index is updated, which is annual from 1978-1989, and generally every two years from 1990-2006. G-Index is the proxy for shareholder rights. Institutional Ownership is the percentage of equity owned by institutions based on their quarterly 13F filings from the Thomson database. Return on Equity is the firm's earnings divided by the book value of equity based on Compustat. Sales Growth is the annualized percentage change in total sales based on Compustat. The Herfindahl Index is a concentration index based on sales in the firm's 48 Fama-French industry group, also based on Compustat. Dividend Yield is the ratio of dividends paid over the market capitalization at fiscal year-end based on Compustat. S&P500 Dummy equals one if the firm is included in the S&P 500 index and zero otherwise. Q is a proxy of the market-to-book of the firm's assets based on Compustat. Compustat Firms Acquired is the percentage of all Compustat firms that were acquired in a full takeover based on Compustat and SDC. Firm Acquired is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is acquired. Firm Acquiring is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm acquires another firm in a full takeover according to the SDC database. Acquisition CAR is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date of the acquisition for the acquiring firm based on a market model and CRSP daily return data. Takeover Beta is the firm's loading on the takeover factor based on daily CRSP returns, using a model that also includes market, size, BM and momentum factors. Market Beta is the firm's loading on the CRSP market return based on daily CRSP returns, using a model that also includes size, BM, momentum and takeover factors. 
TABLE II PORTFOLIO-BASED ABNORMAL RETURNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE G-INDEX
Panel A presents excess returns and abnormal return results (alpha) as measured by the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, with portfolios value-weighted by stock's market capitalization. Panel B presents excess and abnormal return results (alpha) with portfolios that are equally weighted. Both excess and abnormal returns are annualized with t-statistics presented below the returns. We use four different time periods. Q1 and Q5 are the results for the portfolio consisting of firms with, respectively, the 20% lowest and highest GIndex scores, while Q1-Q5 is the long-short portfolio that consists of buying stocks in Q1 and simultaneously selling stocks in Q5. D1, D10 and D1-D10 are the analogous results based on sorting stocks into deciles according to firms' G-Index scores. See the text for an explanation for industry-adjusting procedures. We show results both for portfolios weighted by stock's market capitalization (VW) and for portfolios that are equally weighted (EW). The abnormal returns are annualized with t-statistics presented below the returns. We use four different time periods. Q1 and Q5, respectively, are the results for the portfolio with the 20% lowest and highest G-Index stocks at portfolio formation, while Q1-Q5 is the long-short portfolio that consists of buying stocks in Q1 and simultaneously selling stocks in Q5. D1, D10 and D1-D10 are the analogous results based on sorting stocks into deciles according to firms' G-Index scores. 
PANEL

PANEL A. INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED ALPHAS
TABLE IV DISTRIBUTION OF TIME-VARYING FIRM-LEVEL BETAS BY G-INDEX QUINTILE
Over each period over which the G-Index is updated, we regress the daily excess stock return on a constant, daily factor returns plus their one-day lags. The firm level beta is calculated as the sum of the loading on the contemporaneous factor return plus the loading on the one-day lagged factor return. Next, every period we construct G-Index quintiles based on the firm's G-Index score at the beginning of the period. In panel A, we report the percentiles of the market beta using the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart model, by G-Index quintile. In panel B, we report the percentiles of the takeover beta using a five-factor model that also includes the takeover factor from Cremers, Nair and John (2009 
TABLE V FIRM-SPECIFIC, TIME-VARYING BETAS: G-INDEX QUINTILES
The dependent variable, firms' annualized abnormal return, is estimated for each firm for each year using the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model. The Fama-French four factor model was estimated for each firm for each time period between updates of the G-Index (annual for 1978-1989 and approximately every 2 years for 1990-2007) using daily return data. Both Panels A and B regress this dependent variable on dummies representing inclusion in bottom (Q1) or the top quintile (Q5) of the G-Index distribution for the particular year. Panel B uses (but does not report) as additional controls the lagged values of the following variables: inclusion in the S&P 500 index; log of market capitalization; institutional ownership; return on equity; sales growth; Hefindahl score of the firm's industry; dividend yield; the log of the firm's book-to-market ratio and the daily abnormal return. In all specifications year fixed effects were used with some specifications using industry fixed effects (based either on the Fama-French (FF) 48 industries or 3-digit SIC or FF48 x. year fixed effects) or firm fixed effects. Robust standards errors are clustered at the firm level. Coefficient values are multiplied by 100 so they are expressed in percentage terms. 
PANEL A: WITHOUT ADDITIONAL CONTROLS
TABLE VI FIRM-SPECIFIC, TIME-VARYING BETAS: CONTINUOUS G-INDEX
The dependent variable, firms' annualized abnormal return, is estimated as in Table V . Panel A regresses this dependent variable on the (continuous) G-Index. Panel B uses (but do not report) as additional controls the lagged values of the following variables: inclusion in the S&P 500 index; log of market capitalization; institutional ownership; return on equity; sales growth; Hefindahl score of the firm's industry; dividend yield; the log of the firm's book-to-market ratio and the daily abnormal return. In all specifications year fixed effects were used with some specifications using industry fixed effects (based either on the Fama-French (FF) 48 industries or 3-digit SIC or FF48 x. year fixed effects) or firm fixed effects. Robust standards errors are clustered at the firm level. Coefficient values are multiplied by 100 so they are expressed in percentage terms. Table VII  THE ASSOCIATION AND M&A ACTIVITY The dependent variable, firms' annualized abnormal return, is calculated in the same manner as in Table V . The annualized daily abnormal returns are regressed on the (continuous) G-Index; the number of M&A transactions in the particular year; and the interaction of the G-Index and the M&A variable. All specifications use the additional controls of Panel B of Tables V and VI. In all specifications year fixed effects were used with some specifications using industry fixed effects (based either on the Fama-French (FF) 48 industries or 3-digit SIC or 48 FF x. year fixed) or firm fixed effects. Robust standards errors are clustered at the firm level. Coefficient values are multiplied by 100 so they are expressed in percentage terms. 
TABLE VIII ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY
The dependent variable, firms' annualized abnormal return, is calculated in the same manner as in Table V . The annualized abnormal returns are regressed on the (continuous) G-Index; the number of M&A transactions in the particular year; the interaction of the G-Index and the M&A variable; a dummy for whether the company was acquired in the particular year (Target); and the acquisition announcement returns using a three-day window if the firm made an acquisition announcement (Acq_Return). The regressions use (but do not report) as controls the lagged values of the same additional variables used in Panel B of Table V . In all specifications year fixed effects were used with some specifications using industry fixed effects (based either on the Fama-French (FF) 48 industries or 3-digit SIC) or firm fixed effects. Robust standards errors are clustered at the firm level. Coefficient values are multiplied by 100 so they are expressed in percentage terms. 
TABLE IX ABNORMAL RETURNS CONTROLLING FOR TAKEOVER FACTOR
The dependent variable, firms' annualized abnormal returns, is calculated using the Fama-French-Cahart four factor model and, in addition, the takeover factor of Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) . The annualized abnormal returns so calculated are regressed on the G-Index (either continuous or using dummies for bottom (Q1) and top (Q5) of the G-Index distribution); the number of M&A transactions in the particular year; and the interaction of the two. The regressions use (but do not report) as controls the lagged values of the same variables as in Panel B of Tables V and IV. In all specifications year fixed effects were used with some specifications using industry fixed effects (based either on the Fama-French (FF) 48 industries or 3-digit SIC) or firm fixed effects. Robust standards errors are clustered at the firm level. Coefficient values are multiplied by 100 so they are expressed in percentage terms. 
TABLE X TAKEOVER BETAS
The dependent variable is the beta on the takeover factor of Cremers, Nair and John (2009) . The takeover beta is estimated by regressing daily stock returns for a particular firm on the Fama-French four factor model plus the takeover factor using the same time periods as in Table V. The takeover betas are then regressed on the (continuous) G-Index; the number of M&A transactions in the particular year and the interaction of the two. Some specifications control for lag value of the takeover beta. All specification control for (but do not report) the lagged values of the same variables as used in Panel B of Table V . In all specifications year and firm fixed effects were used. Robust standards errors are clustered at the firm level. 
